State Constitutions

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STATE CONSTITUTIONS.

It is conceded by all parties, in words at least, that Kansas is a Free State, by virtue of the will of her inhabitants, while by her admission into the Union under the Lecompton Constitution¹ she would become nominally a Slave State. The advocates of her admission under that Constitution assume that on her admission steps would at once be taken to alter or destroy the Lecompton Constitution, though it expressly inhibits any change being made prior to 1864. It is a grave question whether the people of a State are justified in setting aside a provision of their Constitution for the purpose of substituting for it another—whether they ought not to follow the course prescribed in the existing Constitution, in order to create another.

There is no doubt that the people are sovereign—that there is no limitation to their power, except such as they themselves, from a conviction of policy and necessity, have set up. But powers of any kind should never, if it can be avoided, be stretched to their furthest limits; and least of all, should the greatest and most fundamental of powers—that of the people of a sovereign State—be employed to its very furthest extent, to the extent of setting aside the Constitution, in a manner forbidden by that Constitution itself.

To admit that the people of Kansas, or rather an accidental majority of the Legislature, may set the Constitution of the State at defiance, is to make the organic law subject and inferior to the ordinary State law, and leaves the dearest rights of the minority at the mercy of the majority. The Constitution is the guarantee which the minority have, that except in a certain prescribed manner and with certain preliminaries, the majority shall not fundamentally alter the organic law by which the community is governed. It is a wholesome limitation to the powers of Legislatures, which otherwise might be tyrannically exercised. Above all, it is the sole guarantee of the stability and permanence of the institutions of the State. This element of stability is the one that our Democratic form of government is most apt to lack. We acquiesce in the frequent and often mischievous changes made by our municipal and State Legislators, mainly because we rely on the Constitution as a barrier against their imprudence and love of novelty. While they are circumscribed by the limitations of the organic law, we know that they cannot do vital injury to the State. But remove those limitations; let it be understood, in the case of Kansas or any other State, that a Constitution may be tampered with and its provisions set at defiance whenever an accidental majority of the Legislature choose; and we have no guarantee that an untrammelled Legislature will not extend its own term over six, ten, or twenty years. The Constitutions of several States are in fact the main guarantees of our privileges and independence; and if they are in any case suffered to be set aside by Legislatures we have no security for any of our social institutions. The school system, the administration of Justice, and even the Franchise itself, exist only by virtue of the Constitution; the Legislature once suffered to become the master instead of the servants of that instrument, and a long stride will have been taken towards the surrender of our independence and self government. In this and the neighboring city, we have seen how Legislatures will interfere with local affairs, even under the Constitution; what would they hesitate at doing, if a precedent were established in Kansas of a Legislature overriding a Constitution? We therefore are not surprised at the stand taken by Senator Douglas,² against admitting a Constitution which is to be violated directly it is established; for the very essence of Popular Sovereignty would be destroyed, were the inviolability and sacredness of a State Constitution set at nought.

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